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Abstract – As the value and merit of red team exercises in 
both academic and corporate settings continues to grow, 
the need to share experiences with staffing, organizing and 
supporting the red team becomes increasingly important.  
This paper documents the Northeast Collegiate Cyber 
Defense Competition’s (NECCDC) Red Team captain’s 
experiences and lessons learned over the past four years.  
The paper will begin by identifying the skills and attributes 
needed for a Red Team and a process for selecting and 
recruiting members.  The methods employed to form a 
cohesive working group from the members in the time 
available prior to the event will be discussed.  The 
resources necessary for the Red Team to be effective and 
how they were provided is examined.  We will look at how 
to promote planning and organization within the team 
focused on specific strategic goals and objectives of the 
Red Team.  There are several duties during the event for a 
Red Team captain that will be examined and cautions that 
will be explained. At the end of the competition, the style 
and delivery of the after-action-report can have a profound 
effect on the Blue Teams.  Experience with different 
approaches over the years will be examined. 
Recommendations for Red Team/Blue Team exchanges that 
can maximize the learning outcome for the students will be 
provided.  Finally this paper will provide a summary of the 
experiences for others seeking to form and organize a Red 
Team either for a competition or an internal educational 
event. 
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1 Introduction 
The threats to an organization’s information 
infrastructure today have never been greater as 
illustrated by the FBI/CSI Computer Crime Survey. 
From the often quoted Sun Tzu we have “If you know 
the enemy and know yourself you need not fear the 
results of a hundred battles.”[1]  Professor Pascale 
Carayon describes Red Teaming as “an advanced 
form of assessment that can be used to identify 
weaknesses in the security of a variety of systems. The 
red team approach is based on the premise that an 
analyst who attempts to model an adversary can find 
systemic vulnerabilities in a computer and information 
system that would otherwise go undetected.”[2]  As 
the value and merit of Red Team exercises in both 
academic and commercial settings continues to grow 
the need to share experiences with staffing, organizing 
and supporting the red team become vitally important.  
This paper documents the Northeast Collegiate Cyber 
Defense Competitions (NCCDC) Red Team captain’s 
experiences over the past four years.  The many issues 
influencing the selection of skills and capabilities, the 
organization and planning, and the execution of the 
event from the Red Team perspective will be 
examined. 
2 Assembling the Team 
The selection of the individuals for any activity 
requiring highly skilled members is critical to their 
combined success.  Red Teams are especially 
sensitive because of the high degree of specialized 
skills and the pressure of the competition itself. 
There are three characteristics that we looked for in 
recruiting Red Team members.  First, passion for the 
security field is the best motivator when a difficult 
situation or road block presents itself.  It pushes the 
individual to perform above and beyond their limits. 
Second, skill, preparation and dependability: can they 
do the job?  Are they willing to work long hours for 
no pay? Can they deliver what they promise? The best 
indicator I have found is references, recommendations 
and experience and I rely on all three routinely.   
And third, do they exhibit the characteristics of 
cooperation, camaraderie, and team focus?  Are they 
wild horses that cannot or will not pull together for the 
team but run off by themselves?  Do they see 
themselves as part of something bigger, i.e. the team?  
Can they see the goals of the team and work towards 
them?  As with the previous set of characteristics, 
references, recommendations and experience are 




2.1 Diversity of Skills 
Being an expert is important but having the right 
mix of skills is critical.[4]  Having the right blend of 
talents and two-deep coverage on the team in vital 
areas can make all of the difference for red team 
success. 
The skills necessary for a red team member cut 
across many areas and are changing every year.  
New languages, OS distros, applications, and 
networking gear add to the challenge each year.  
Some of the skills currently on the list are: 
Windows, Linux and Cisco platforms, vulnerability.  
Additionally, exploit development, exploit 
execution, persistence, stealthy techniques, web 
application exploits, and social engineering are 
valuable. 
In comparison, the blue team must consider in its 
candidate selection and training the duplication of 
skill sets across their membership.  This goal is 
primarily driven by the possibility that a member 
might be lost due to illness or as part of the exercise.  
Two-deep coverage on the red team is chiefly driven 
by the benefits derived from the mutual support and 
greater problem solving capabilities gained from “an 
extra set of eyes” and “a different point of view” of 
a difficulty.  Therefore selecting at least two red 
team members focused or at least proficient at every 
skill area has proven itself a valuable goal. 
2.2 Camaraderie  
Not the most technical characteristic but amity and 
solidarity are none the less very important to the red 
team.  The members of the team must not only 
respect each other’s technical skills but appreciate 
the opportunity to red team together.  Disrespect or 
even antagonism can severely impact the 
performance of the team as a whole. 
Since typically the Red Team comes from a wide 
geographical area, they may not know each other 
socially.  The best indicator is how they worked as a 
team member during the previous year’s exercises.  
However, with new members that may not be 
possible.  Soliciting feedback from established 
members is critical.  Some of the best indicators 
come from Twitter and other social networking sites.  
The tenor of their posts, how others respond, and 
what other say about the candidates can reveal much 
about their character and how they might work as a 
team. 
3 Provisioning the Team 
Whether you are going camping in the Rocky 
Mountains or making dinner, you need certain 
resources and equipment to be successful.  A red team 
has requirements as well that help ensure that they 
accomplish their goals. 
3.1 Resources Required 
The most obvious requirement is a computer.  The 
workstation that the red team member works on is 
their main tool and a very personal one.  Typically 
the red team members are required to prepare and 
bring their own workstation including any and all 
software they might require.  Frequently they bring 
more than one and sometimes a server or networking 
gear as well. 
There are more mundane resources needed by the 
red team.  Besides your basic pens, paper, 
whiteboards, and markers, we have found several 
other valuable resources.  In short lived, fast paced 
exercises, intra-team communication is crucial to 
getting the most out of the team.  A bag of USB 
sticks helps quickly move data and tools around.  A 
networked printer in the red team room for 
documentation and reports is useful.  Keeping track 
of who has what IP address within the red team, 
what is known about the blue teams, who is focusing 
on what aspect of which blue team, and a host of 
other information can be facilitated by whiteboards, 
poster boards on the walls and lots of duct tape 
(lots).  But this year, the best tools utilized by the 
red team for organizing and keeping track of both 
the blue and red teams was Armitage.[5]  This GUI 
interface for Metasploit with its team collaboration 
support provided a great platform for intra-team 
documentation and coordination of effort.  Armitage 
facilitated the coordination of members skilled at 
target acquisition, exploitation, persistence and 
score-able information harvesting. 
3.2 Support Structure 
In addition to the resources mentioned, the 2011 red 
team was supported by an individual on the red team 
dedicated to system support. This was one of the 
improvements requested by several of last year’s red 
team.  With the compressed time frame of the 
exercise it was felt that an individual who could 
maintain support services such as a red team web, 
DNS, DHCP and other services as identified for the 
rest of the red team would aid in keeping the red 
team members focused on the attacks. 
 
One of the time consuming and distracting tasks for 
the red team was recording and submitting score-
able accomplishments. The system support 
individual prepared and managed a system to make 
it easier for the red team members to construct a 
report of a new exploit or duplicate a similar 
existing report and modify it.  This system also 
helped to sure that all required information and 
evidence was included in the report to make sure 
that it was grade-able by the white team. 
4 Team Planning 
Six to nine months before the event, the recruiting of 
red team members begins.  It has to start this early to 
get on peoples calendars before other commitments.  
Even then their commitment can be superseded by 
employer priorities or family demands (new additions 
to a family do take priority).  In four years of 
planning, there has always been at least one member 
whose plans get thwarted. Therefore, it is advisable to 
recruit at least one extra member for the red team. 
The security community is a relatively small and 
remarkably close society.  Coupled with the need for 
camaraderie and that the group will be working very 
closely and intensely for three long days, soliciting 
suggestions from returning members for new recruits 
is a big plus.  They can also provide feedback on 
potential new members. This activity solidifies the 
members ownership of responsibility for the teams 
overall success and provides the red team captain with 
a much broader view of the perspective market place 
for new members. 
4.1 “…Know thyself” 
As the membership in the red team is incrementally 
established, team building activities can begin.   
Several mechanisms for intra-team communication 
have been tried: wikis, Google groups and docs, etc.  
Everyone’s life is busy and you are asking these 
folks to volunteer a nice chunk of their time (much 
of it personal) with no remuneration other than some 
fame and bragging rights.  Communication has to be 
easy.  It has to be normal.  None of the tools 
mentioned was used by a large enough segment of 
the team to become adopted.  Plain old email has 
year after year ended up being the communication 
platform of choice that everyone could live with. 
The first item of business is to introduce all of the 
members to each other.  The captain typically starts 
with a short bio, background and skills. The rest of 
the team follows with their contribution.  The 
captain should collect all of these as late joining 
members will need to be brought up to speed. 
The next phase is planning a strategy for the event.  
The captain might start with some questions for the 
team such as: Do we assign red team members to 
each blue team or to each target type?  Much of the 
planning is only instigated by the red team captain.  
Once started often the red team members direct the 
planning themselves with minimal steerage from the 
captain. 
4.2 Clarifying the Goals of the Red Team 
Red teaming is thrilling. The hunt and capture 
aspect is exhilarating.  One problem that has been 
seen in previous red team exercises is the loss of 
focus on what is the red team’s actual goal.  That 
question is often answered with “Well, breaking into 
the blue teams systems of course!”  The problem 
with that answer is that it is neither accurate nor 
realistic.  An attacker in the wild would break into a 
system but that would not be their goal.  Their goal 
is to secure a reward.  That reward might come in 
the form of compensation for items acquired after 
breaking in such as credit card numbers, PII or trade 
secrets. Their goal is something on the other side of 
the door they forced open. 
For the red team the goal is to score points.  Those 
points come can come from breaking in but it does 
not stop there.  Often the red team can become 
focused on the exploit and lose sight of the more 
realistic goal of obtaining database contents, 
credentials, PII and confidential documents.  The 
exploit is professionally satisfying and therefore can 
itself become the focus.  The red team needs to be 
encouraged to look beyond the exploit and focus on 
scoring as many points as possible. 
Part of the planning of the red team is answering the 
question: “Now that we are in do we pillage or 
burn?”  There is a part of most folks that want to 
“rm –rf /” when they get privileges.  And although 
that does score points because you could do it and 
the blue team loses more points because they are 
down and miss service checks, is it the best 
approach if the goal of the red team is to score as 
many points as possible?  The red team has tossed 
around this question many times and evolved an 
heuristic approach to the issue which will 
undoubtedly change again.  Using the law of 
diminishing returns, once the score-able points 
gleaned from a system nears zero and no additional 
avenues of attack present themselves, plant as many 
backdoors as possible and bring the system down.  
Nearing the end of a day when it is no longer 
possible to recover, burn the system.  The mental 
and morale strike of having a system down over 
 
night is a tough hit. At the beginning of the last day 
wipe all systems possible so that recovery is futile.   
5 Challenges Faced 
Probably the greatest challenge to the red team is 
time.  Realistically an attacker would be able to 
perform reconnaissance stealthily over a long period.  
The time compression of the event makes stealth 
difficult.  It also makes recovery of lost persistence 
within the blue team costly in terms of points scored.  
The best defense against time for the red team is 
planning and preparation.     
5.1 The Unknown 
Time is not the only challenge to the red team.  
Typically few facts are known about the target 
infrastructure and nothing is known about the 
business injects that will be employed.  The 
inclusion of injects that involve forensics on boxes, 
VoIP, SCADA, non-typical network devices or OSs, 
or other unusual services become difficult to exploit 
without time to overcome the often steep learning 
curve. 
6 Duties of the Red Team Captain 
Besides the recruiting, organizing, and provisioning 
responsibilities already mentioned, the red team 
captain works with the white team before the event to 
develop a working relationship and provide input on 
competition development. 
It is helpful to red team morale if they can all stay at 
the same hotel.  The red team often worked late into 
the night on exploit development and planning.  Last 
year we were able to procure a meeting room at the 
hotel for part of the time to facilitate this after hours 
work. 
Even with the scoring system, the red team captain 
must read and validate all of the scoring reports before 
they are forwarded to the white team.  Last year we 
thought that the new red team scoring system would 
eliminate the captain validation step but it did not and 
likely cannot.  Mistakes will be made and issues of 
misunderstanding of score-able events and reporting 
consistency between members of the red team will 
continue to require the captain’s scrutiny. 
Relative to scoring, the red team captain should work 
with the white team to clarify how the scoring will 
work.  The red team members need to know what are 
considered score-able items or activities.  The scoring 
function should emulate the relative value of various 
assets and difficulty of acquiring them.  Without this 
knowledge the red team must rely on guesses and 
assumptions. 
One of the duties that keep the red team captain 
constantly busy throughout the event is taking 
questions from the red team to the white team for 
clarification and ruling.  Is it allowed to do ...?  Can 
we get points for …?  Does this rule mean …?  About 
a third of the red team captain’s time during the event 
is spent resolving red team questions. 
Another third of the red team captain’s time is spent 
answering questions from the white team.  Explaining 
what a scoring reports means is frequent but other 
white team questions come up as well.  Is this alarmed 
event because of a red team action?  Did the red team 
do …?  Did you folks brick …?  We are seeing … - is 
that you folks? 
6.1 Cautions for the Red Team Captain 
The red team captain is typically going to be as 
much of a “techie” as the rest of the red team 
members.  The attraction to “join in the fun” and 
perform exploits and dig for score-able things is 
magnetic.  My experience is that when the red 
team’s captain “plays” the duties that fall solely on 
the red team captain’s shoulders do not get the 
attention necessary and both the red team and the 
competition can suffer.  The caution is “even if you 
think you can wear two hats at once, your head is 
not really that big!”  If you accept the role of red 
team captain, also accept that you will not be 
performing exploits. 
7 After Action Report 
Besides the competition aspect, the CCDC events are 
a powerful and unique learning experience for the 
students.  Attending blue teams come with all levels of 
preparation and skill.  Part of the value of the red team 
is to give the blue teams both encouragement to 
continue in the security field and comeback next year 
as well as feedback on what they did well and how 
they can improve in the future. 
Traditionally the red team has conducted an after 
action debriefing to all of the blue teams at once at the 
end of the event.  The report has been part 
introduction to the red team members and a general 
overview of what the red team has accomplished and 
observed.  The problem was that the presentation was 
limited in time and could only be very general.  Also 
new teams can get overwhelmed and possibly 
discouraged because of inadequate preparation and 
experience.  These teams need encouragement and 
support to not give up. 
 
Last year at the 2011 NECCDC, we tried something 
different with two teams that struggled during the 
competition.  Their coaches asked us to stop in and 
talk to them giving some pointers and specific 
feedback.  We then conducted our typical all team 
debriefing.  Our experience with the two teams 
meeting with them individually was an epiphany.  The 
change in their attitude and morale was striking.  We 
spent 15 minutes with each of the two teams.  We 
were able to provide specific feedback about their 
team.  We also answered lots of their specific 
questions about what we did and what they could do 
to better prepare.  At the end there was no question 
that they had benefitted from the competition and 
were coming back next year. 
8 Conclusions 
Our experience with assigning red team members to 
skill and application specific areas, instead of to a 
blue team, has served us well.  It made the most 
effective use of our skills and attention. 
It is imperative that the red team through the red team 
captain be involved with the white team before the 
event, consulting on the design and development of 
the exercise.  A blind red team mainly tests the red 
team’s skills not the blue team’s skills and 
preparation.[6]  
Our experience with the one-on-one debriefings with 
the blue teams has convinced us of their value to the 
students.  We are recommending next year that time 
be allocated after the event to allow the red team to 
meet individually for 15 minutes with each of the blue 
teams.  It is our experience that this provides better 
feedback and more values to the students. 
 
9 Acknowledgments 
This paper could not have been written without the 
shared experiences of many people.  I would like to 
acknowledge the work of the 2011 NECCD Red 
Team: Jonathan Claudius from Trustwave, Laura 
Guay from SecureWorks, Raphael Mudge from 
Delaware Air National Guard, TJ OConnor from US 
Army, Ryan Reynolds from Crowe Horwath, Jason  
Nehrboss from CSC/Bath Iron Works, Joshua 
Abraham from Rapid7, Will Vandevanter from 
Rapid7, Gerry Brunelle from Boeing, Todd Leetham 
from EMC, and Silas Cutler from RIT.  I also need to 
thank Tom Vachon from Kayak as the white team 
captain and Themis Papageorge from Northeastern 
University who organized and hosted the competition 
and many others. 
10 References 
[1]  Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Tribeca Books, 
2011). 
[2] P. Carayon and S. Kraemer, “Red Team 
Performance: Summary of Findings University of 
Wisconsin-Madison & IDART: Sandia National 
Laboratories” (2004). 
[3]  Furtun , et al, “A structured approach for 
implementing cyber security exercises”, 2010 8th 
International Conference on Communications 
(COMM),  
[4] Dodge, R.C., Jr.;  Ragsdale, D.J.;  
Reynolds, C., “Organization and training of a 
cyber security team,” SMC’03 Conference 
Proceedings. 2003 IEEE International 
Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics. 
Conference Theme - System Security and 
Assurance, 2003. 
 
[5] Raphael Mudge, “Armitage - Cyber 




[6] P. Herzog, “OSSTMM 3 – The Open 




[7] G. B White and D. Williams, “The 
collegiate cyber defense competition,”,  
Proceedings of the 9th Colloquium for 
Information Systems Security Education, 2005. 
[8] P. Sroufe, S. R. Tate, R. Dantu, E. Celikel, 
“Experiences During a Collegiate Cyber Defense 
Competition,” Journal of Applied Security 
Research, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2010, pp. 382–396. 
[9] J. Mattson, “Cyber Defense Exercise: A 
Service Provider Model,” in Fifth World 
Conference on Information Security Education, 
2007, 81–86. 
